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Rethinking Statutory Antiwaiver
Provisions Following the Lloyd's of
London Litigation
Mark J. Loewenstein*
In the Lloyd's ofLondon cases, the United States Courts of
Appeals upheld certain forum-selection clauses that effectually
deprived investors ofthe protections ofthe federal securities laws
as if the investors had expressly waived those protections. This
article examines statutory antiwaiver provisions in light of the
Lloyd's cases, exploring the effect those provisions have on the
administration of the federal securities laws, and suggests that
the law be amended to allow contractual waiver in certain circumstances.

Introduction
This essay is about those statutory provisions, generally found in
consumer protection and civil rights laws, that prohibit persons from
contractually avoiding the law's protective provisions. Courts and
commentators refer to such provisions as ''antiwaiver'' or ''nonwaiver'' provisions. At first glance, the purpose and meaning of
such provisions seem clear and obvious-to guaranty that the
protective provisions of the law will not be lost to the terms of an
over-reaching contract. 1 By contrast, because some statutes expressly preclude waiver, one might reasonably assume that the
*Mark J. Loewenstein is a Professor of Law at the University of Colorado,
Boulder, Colorado. The author wishes to thank his colleague, Curtis Bradley,
for his helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this essay, and
Catherine Woods and Scott James for their research assistance.
1

See, e.g., A.J. Temple Marble & Tile, Inc. v. Union Carbide Marble Care,
Inc., 618 N.Y.S. 2d 155, 159 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994), afrd, 625 N.Y.S.2d 904
(N.Y. App. Div. 1995), aff'd as mod., 87 N.Y.2d 574 (1996) (the purpose of
an anti waiver provision in the New York Franchise Sales Act was "to prevent
a franchisor from contracting out of the liability imposed on the franchisor
under the Act.'').
48
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absence of such a provision means that contracting parties may
waive the protections of the statute. In practice, however, the interpretation of an antiwaiver section, and the meaning of a statute
without an antiwaiver section, are not so simple. While some exceptions exist,2 numerous cases suggest that a person for whose benefit
a statute was enacted generally cannot waive the protections of the
statute by contract, either because the waiver violates the public
policy as expressed in the law, 3 or because the waiver would be unconscionable. 4 Thus, courts generally interpret statutes without an
antiwaiver section as though such a section were present in the statute.
More startling, in a recent series ofcases, the federal courts held,
2
The principal exception relates to statutes that do not reflect a broad public
interest that would be adversely affected if the statute's protections were waivable. For instance, the statute of frauds may be waived by the person who
would otherwise be able to invoke its protections. 8 Williston on Contracts
485 (4th Ed. 1998). See also, American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. v.
Roberts, 461 N.E.2d 856, 857 (N.Y. 1984), where the court upheld a collective bargaining agreement that waived certain rights to meal breaks that the
employees had under the New York Labor Law. The New York Court of Appeals concluded that:

We perceive no overriding public policy that prevents waiver or
modification of the precise statutory terms so long as the legislative
purpose is not undermined.
Later in the opinion, referring to other cases in which the courts enforced
waiver, the court noted that:
[t]he focus in these cases, in which there was no express legislative
indication that waiver was precluded, is upon the existence of a bona fide
agreement by which the employee received a desired benefit in return for
the waiver, the complete absence of duress, coercion or bad faith and the
open and knowing nature of the waiver's execution.
Id. at859. Compare, cases collected in note 3, infra.
3

E.g., Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 704 (1945) ("a statutory right conferred on a private party, but affecting the public interest, may
not be waived or released if such waiver or release contravenes the statutory
policy."); Redel's Inc. v. General Electric Co., 498 F.2d 95,99 (5th Cir. 1974)
(prospective release of antitrust violations ''is clearly against public policy'');
Green v. Republic Steel Corp., 338 N.E.2d. 594, 596 (N.Y. 1975) (agreement
prospectively waiving unemployment benefits unenforceable because it would
''conflict with the purpose of the legislation which was designed to benefit
those in need of assistance.'')
4

E.g., Lockamy v. Byrne, 474 So.2d 372 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (waiver
of protections of Florida Residential Landlord and Tenant Act unconscionable
as a matter of law).
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in effect, that an investor could waive the protections of the federal
securities laws, notwithstanding the antiwaiver sections of those
laws. In the Lloyd's of London cases,S which consist of eight decisions of the United States Courts of Appeals, the courts upheld the
parties' designation of English law and English courts. By upholding this choice-of-law/forum-selection clause, the courts deprived
the Lloyd's investors of the protections of the federal securities laws
as though the investors had expressly waived those protections.
These opinions were, in this author's view, plainly wrong. 6 While
the outcome of the Lloyd's cases is defensible as a matter of
policy-the investors should have been held to their contracts-that
outcome is indefensible as a matter of statutory interpretation.
The presence of an antiwaiver se.ction-as illustrated by the
Lloyd's cases-potentially has three harmful effects. First, to reach
a just result, courts exercised legislative, not judicial, functions in
rewriting a statute, never a happy prospect in a democracy. Second,
the uncertain effect of the antiwaiver sections in the federal securities laws complicates business dealings. Finally, the antiwaiver sections of the federal securities laws have complicated the administration of those laws, even aside from the problems posed by the
Lloyd's cases. Each of these effects is discussed below.
The second portion of this article examines antiwaiver provisions
in the context of the federal securities laws, and then more generally. The second portion concludes that the courts have moved away
from a strict interpretation of antiwaiver sections, ~st by enforcing
5

Lipcon v. Underwriters at Lloyd's of London, 148 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir.
1998); Roby Corp. v. Corporation of Lloyd's, 996 F.2d 1353 (2d Cir.). cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 945 (1993); Stamm v. Barclays Bank ofNew York, 153 F.3d
30 (2d Cir. 1998); Allen v. Lloyd's of London, 94 F.3d 923 (4th Cir. 1996);
Haynsworth v. The Corporation, a/k/a Lloyd's of London, 121 F.3d 956 (5th
Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 1513 (1998); Shell v. R.W. Sturge Ltd., 55
F.3d 1227 (6th Cir. 1995); Bonny v. Society of Lloyd's, 3 F.3d 156 (7th Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1113 (1994); Richards v. Lloyd's of London,
135 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 1998 WL 221301 (1998); Riley v.
Kingsley Underwriting Agencies Ltd., 969 F.2d 953 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied,
506 u.s. 1021 (1992).
6

This is also the view taken by the North American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA), which filed an amicus curiae brief with the
Supreme Court, urging the Court to grant certiorari to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Richards v. Lloyd's of London, 135 F.3d 1289
(9th Cir. 1998). NASAA argued that the Ninth Circuit misapplied the antiwaiver sections of the federal securities laws when it held enforceable the
choice-of-law/forum-selection clause of the agreement in question.
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arbitration provisions that deprived securities law claimants of a
judicial remedy and then by enforcing choice-of-law/forumselection clauses that deprived those claimants of the substantive
protections of the statutes. The third part of this essay looks at
judicial interpretation of statutes that are silent on the question of
waiver; that is, statutes that neither permit nor prohibit waiver. A
review of the civil rights and antitrust law cases discussed in the
third part suggests that statutes reflecting an important public interest are construed as though they contain antiwaiver sections. As the
federal securities laws reflect important public interests, merely
excising the antiwaiver sections from the federal securities laws
may not solve the problem posed by the Lloyd's cases. Part four of
this article explores briefly the complicating effect of the antiwaiver
sections in the administration of the federal securities laws, and
proposes a revised provision. This article concludes that Congress
should amend the federal securities laws to allow contractual
waiver, at least under circumstances such as those presented in the
Lloyd's cases.

Statutory Antiwaiver Provisions
The Antiwaiver Sections of the Federal Securities Laws
Waivers in Settlements

Each of the five statutes that comprise the federal securities laws
contains a section, in substantially similar language, prohibiting
waiver of its provisions. 7 The antiwaiver section of the Securities
Act is typical:
Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person
acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision of
this title or of the rules and regulations of the Commission shall
be void. 8
These antiwaiver sections generally arise in three different
7

See Securities Act of 1933, Section 14, 15 U.S.C. § 17n (1994); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, Section 29, 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1994); Public Utilities
Holding Companies Act of 1935, Section 26, 15 U.S.C. § 79z (1994); Trust
Indenture Act of 1939, Section 327, 15 U.S.C. § 77aaaa (1994); Investment
Company Act of 1940, Section 104, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-46 (1994); Investment
Advisors Act of 1940, Section 215, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-15 (1994).
8

15 U.S.C. § 77n (1994).
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contexts: settlements, arbitration or choice-of-forum clauses, and
choice-of-law clauses. The starting point for the analysis of any
waiver issue is whether the ''condition, stipulation, or provision'' in
question prospectively waives ''compliance'' with any provision of
the law. 9 If so, the waiver is invalid; if not, the waiver is likely valid.
Read literally, the antiwaiver section seems inapplicable to releases
of past noncompliance, because the section appears to be forwardlooking. It protects a person ''acquiring any security,'' not a person
who has acquired a security and subsequently released someone
who failed to comply. 10 Nevertheless, the courts have applied the
section to releases, holding, for instance, that a broad general release
covers only those securities claims that the releasor knew of or had
reason to know of. 11
An expansive reading of the antiwaiver section can even void a
release of a known claim, as Pearlstein v. Scudder & German 12
demonstrates. Pearlstein involved an extension of credit by a
registered broker/dealer to a customer in violation of Section 7(c) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act) and
Regulation T of the Federal Reserve System. 13 Together, these provisions prohibited a registered broker/dealer from extending credit
9

Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez v. Shearson/
American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
10

See, e.g., Williams v. Stone, 923 F. Supp. 689, 692-93 (E.D. Pa. 1996),
aff'd on other grounds, 109 F.3d 890 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 383
(1997) (antiwaiver section in Maryland franchise act covers only "prospective'' franchisees, so release executed by existing franchisee would not violate
the antiwaiver section).
11
Goodman v. Epstein, 582 F.2d 388, 402 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 939 (1979): Doody v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 587 F. Supp. 829, 832 (D.
Minn. 1984); American General Insurance Co. v. Equitable General Corp.,
493 F. Supp. 721 (E.D. Va. 1980); Anheuser-Busch Cos. v. Summit Coffee
Co., 858 S.W.2d 928 (Tex. App. 1993), opinion withdrawn in part, 934 S.W.2d
705 (Tx. App. 1996). But see, Driscoll v. Schuttler, 697 F. Supp. 1195 (N.D.
Ga. 1988) (declining to follow Goodman and holding that a broad release was
effective even as to unknown claims). While there are some cases outside of
the securities area construing releases broadly, as in Driscoll, e.g., Watson v.
Union Camp Corp., 861 F. Supp. 1086 (S.D. Ga. 1994) (construing Georgia
law), the weight of authority seems to be consistent with the view expressed in
Goodman, e.g., Farm Credit Bank of St. Louis v. Whitlock, 581 N.E.2d 664
(Ill. 1991) (construing Illinois law), Victoria Bank & Trust Co. v. Brady, 811
S.W.2d 931 (Tex. 1991) (construing Texas law).

12

Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1970).

13

12 C.F.R. § 220.4(c) (2) promulgated pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 78(a).
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to a customer beyond seven days from the date the customer
purchased a security. At the time of the decision, the Second Circuit
recognized a private cause of action for violation of Section 7(c)
and Regulation T. 14 In Pearlstein, the defendant-broker/dealer
violated these provisions when, at the plaintiff-customer's request, it
extended the period of time for payment for two unrelated securities
transactions beyond the prescribed seven days. When the customer
failed to pay under the extension agreements, the broker/dealer sued
with respect to one transaction and threatened suit in the other. Both
matters were settled: in one, the customer signed a stipulation of
settlement; in the other, a confession of judgment. After the
customer repaid the broker/dealer, the customer commenced this
action claiming damages resulting from the broker/dealer's unlawful extension of credit.
The broker/dealer argued that the stipulation of settlement and
confession of judgment settled any claims that the customer might
have under the statute. The court did not agree, instead ruling that
each of these settlements resulted in a continuing violation of the
statute, since each gave the customer additional time to pay. The antiwaiver section then operated to void the settlements because they
contemplated a further violation of the statute.15 In effect, then, the
court characterized the settlement as an impermissible prospective
waiver of the statute. While the court's characterization might be
questioned/ 6 the result is troubling even if the settlements were,
indeed, prospective waivers of Section 7(c). The case demonstrates
the harsh operation of the antiwaiver section, because it is doubtful
that Congress intended Section 7(c) to protect purchasers of securities. 17 Even if that were the purpose, moreover, should not the
customer, who was an attorney and a sophisticated investor, be free
14

Consistent with the trend in the Supreme Court to avoid recognizing
implied private rights of action under federal statutes, the Second Circuit has
since held that no private right of action exists. Bennett v. United States Trust
Co., 770 F.2d 308, 313 (2nd Cir. 1985); Dillon v. Militano, 731 F. Supp. 634
(S.D.N.Y. 1990).
15
Pearlstein, 429 F.2d at 1143 (the waiver would "serve only to legalize the
very extension of credit which the margin requirements seek to prevent and
which suits such as this one serve to discipline.'').

16

See Judge Friendly's dissenting opinion, id. at 1149. See also, supra, note

14.
17

Id. Judge Friendly argues, with persuasive sources, that the purpose of the
margin rules was to control credit in the securities markets so as to limit
speculation and assure the availability of credit in other markets.
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to make this payment arrangement if the broker/dealer agreed? As
Judge Friendly noted in dissent:
[The customer] bought the bonds against defendant's advice,
refused to sell them on its urging, remained silent when the defendant was pressing for payment, and settled his liability after
having had legal advice. Equity would leave the loss where it
was. 18
Judge Friendly argued that Congress intended the antiwaiver sections to overcome what was then a tendency of the courts to limit
the doctrine of illegal contracts. For Judge Friendly, however, the
court in Pearlstein had gone too far, applying the antiwaiver section
to a situation that did not call for its application. 19 Judge Friendly's
call for a narrower reading of the antiwaiver sections was soon
heeded.

The Arbitration Exception
In Wilko v. Swan, 20 a case decided in 1953, the United States
Supreme Court established a bright line rule regarding prospective
waivers of the Securities Act. In holding invalid a contract provision that would have required a buyer of common stock to arbitrate
any future disputes that he had with a securities brokerage finn, the
Court jealously guarded the judicial prerogative. The pro-arbitration
Is Id.
19

Judge Friendly cited a 1915 Supreme Court case, D. R. Wilder Mfg. Co.
v. Corn Products Refining Co., 236 U.S.165 (1915) as an example of the sort
of jurisprudence Congress sought to avoid with the anti waiver sections. In that
case, the parties entered into an agreement that violated the Sherman Act, but
the party that imposed the unlawful trade restraint was successful in persuading the Court that the contract should nonetheless be enforced against the
plaintiff. Presumably, a more modern view of illegality would have denied the
plaintiff the ability to rely on the illegal condition in the contract. Put differently, an antiwaiver section would void defendant's consent to an illegal
condition as an ineffectual waiver. Under this line of reasoning, Congress
included the antiwaiver section to achieve this result, not protect a person in
the position of the customer in Pearlstein, who was not disadvantaged by the
agreement that included the ''objectionable'' extension of credit. Indeed, unlike the illegal condition in D. R. Wilder, which operated to the disadvantage
of the party pleading illegality, the illegal condition in Pearlstein operated to
that party's advantage.
20

Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
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policy reflected in the Federal Arbitration Act21 could not overcome
the requirement of the Securities Act that the courts ''exercise
judicial direction to fairly assure [the] effectiveness'' of the ''protective provisions of the Securities Act.' ' 22
In a pair of decisions in 1987 and 1989, Shearson/American
Express v. McMahon 23 and Rodriguez v. Shearson!American
Express, Inc., 24 however, the Court reversed itself, upholding
contracts that required arbitration of claims under the federal securities laws. This reversal reflected a growing judicial acceptance of
the efficacy of arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism,25 and
represented the first departure from the strict approach of Wilko v.
Swan. Of equal importance, the Court signaled that the antiwaiver
section has some interpretative leeway: '' [T]he right to select the
judicial forum and the wider choice of courts are not such essential
features of the Securities Act that § 14 is properly construed to bar
any waiver of these provisions. Nor are they so critical that they
cannot be waived. . . . '' 26 This flexibility provides support for the
more aggressive rulings of the Circuit courts in the Lloyd's cases,
discussed below.

Widening the Exception: Honoring Foreign Choice-of-Law/ForumSelection Clauses
The Lloyd's of London litigation provided the courts with a challenge to the antiwaiver provisions of the federal securities laws that
was not present in the arbitration cases. The plaintiffs in the arbitration cases retained their substantive rights under the federal securities laws; only their choice of forum was limited. In the Lloyd's
cases, however, the plaintiffs relinquished any claims under the
21

Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§51, et. seq. (1994).

22

346 U.S. at 437.

23

Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).

24

Rodriguez v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).

25

The Court acknowledged the difference in the way at least it perceived
arbitration: ''To the extent that Wilko rested on a suspicion of arbitration as a
method of weakening the protections afforded in the substantive law to
would-be complainants, it has fallen far out of step with our current strong
endorsement of the federal statutes favoring this method of resolving
disputes.'' For a briefhistory of the evolving view of arbitration in the courts,
see Kenneth R. Davis, ''The Arbitration Claws: Unconscionability in the Securities Industry," 78 B.U. L. Rev. 255, 261-78 (1998).
26

Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at 481 (emphasis added).
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federal securities laws by agreeing, at the time they made their
investments, that any disputes would be resolved in England under
English law. The central legal questions in the Lloyd's litigation
were whether this agreement amounted to a waiver under the federal
securities laws and, if so, whether the court should enforce the
waiver. While the plaintiffs had some minor victories along the
way, 27 in the end all eight circuits ruled in favor of the defendants,
enforcing the contractual choice-of-law/forum-selection clauses.28
Interestingly, the courts seemed to assume, without so stating, that
the choice-of-law/forum-selection clauses did amount to a waiver of
the protections of the federal securities laws, so the opinions focused
primarily on whether the ''waiver'' would be enforced. 29
The Lloyd's plaintiffs were several hundred American "Names,"
27

E.g., the plaintiffs prevailed before a panel of the ninth circuit, Richards v.
Lloyd's of London, 107 F .2d 1422 (9th Cir. 1997), but lost when the circuit
court ruled en bane to reverse the panel. 135 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 1998 WL 221301 (1998). Plaintiffs also prevailed before the district
court in Leslie v. Lloyd's of London, 1995 WL 661090 (S.D. Tex. 1995),
which was reversed in Hansworth v. The Corporation, 121 F.3d 614 (5th Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 1513 (1998).
28
29

See supra note 3.

In deciding that the choice-of-law/forum-selection clauses were valid
under the anti waiver sections, the courts implicitly decided that the federal securities laws applied to the transactions. However, the applicability of the
federal securities laws would be debatable even in the absence of the choiceof-law/forum-selection clauses. As an initial matter, the defendants could
argue that the investment in Lloyd's did not involve the sale of a security. If
this argument proved accurate, the courts would not have jurisdiction under
the federal securities laws. Moreover, even if the investment in Lloyd's were a
security, there is a question of whether U.S. law would reach the sale of a security that took place abroad, as was the case here.
Under the liberal definition of a security generally employed by U.S. courts,
the Lloyd's investment would likely, though not certainly, be characterized as
an ''investment contract,'' which satisfies the definition of a security. Securities and Exchange Commission v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). See,
generally, Marc I. Steinberg, Securities Regulation 35-111 (3d Ed. 1998).
Whether U.S. law reaches the alleged fraud, however, is a closer question.
While the issue is not free from doubt, case law suggests that U.S. courts
would exercise jurisdiction under the "conduct test." Under this test, the
courts look to see if substantial fraudulent activity occurred in the United
States, even if the security was sold abroad. As plaintiffs alleged that fraudulent statements were made to them in the United States and caused them to
make the ill-fated investments, this test would likely be satisfied. See, SEC v.
Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 1977) (jurisdiction lies if' 'some activity to
further a fraudulent scheme occurs within this country''). Compare, however,
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who agreed to underwrite insurance risks through Lloyd's of
London. Lloyd's is actually a market in which underwriting
syndicates, consisting of one or more Names, compete for business.
The syndicates are managed by Managing Agents, who deal with
the Names through Members' Agents. To join a syndicate, a Name'
must travel to London and sign a series of documents. The principal
document is the General Undertaking, which includes the choiceof-forum/forum-selection clauses at issue in the cases. 30
Upon executing a General Undertaking, a Name joins an underwriting syndicate and provides underwriting capital. When a
syndicate underwrites a risk, each Name is responsible only for his
share of any loss; however, liability is unlimited for that share.
Names within a syndicate are thus severally liable for the risks undertaken. In light of this financial risk, Names must provide proof of
financial strength, and an irrevocable letter of credit in favor of
Lloyd's.
The litigation arose because several of the syndicates suffered
heavy unanticipated losses in the late 1980s and early 1990s due to
asbestos-related litigation and catastrophic events such as Hurricane
Hugo and the terrorist bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerhie, Scotland. These losses caused intra-market disputes, with
Names accusing Managing Agents and others connected with
Lloyd's of fraud and mismanagement. Some Names instituted litigation and withheld payments due on the liabilities, while others
were unable to meet their obligations. With the integrity of the entire
Lloyd's market in jeopardy, Lloyd's proposed a reorganization that
Bersh v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1018 (1975) (conduct must directly cause the loss). See, generally, Philip R.
Wolf, "International Securities Fraud: Extraterritorial Subject Matter Jurisdiction," 8 N.Y. Intern'l. L. Rev. 1 (1995); David A. Fitzgerald, "Allen v.
Lloyd's of London: A Comment on Forum Selection," 30 Conn. L. Rev. 257
( 1997) (supporting the extraterritorial applicability of the federal securities
laws to the Lloyd's cases).
30

Those clauses provided:

2.1 The rights and obligations of the parties arising out of or relating to
the Member's membership of, and/or underwriting of insurance business
at, Lloyd's and any other matter referred to in this Undertaking shall be
governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of England.
2.2 Each party hereto irrevocably agrees that the courts of England shall
have exclusive jurisdiction to settle any dispute and/or controversy of
whatsoever nature arising out of or relating to the Member's membership of, and/or underwriting of insurance business at Lloyd's ..
Quoted in Richard's, 135 F.3d at 1292.
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would limit the Names' liability, but require them to furnish additional capital.
This plan of reorganization was at issue in the Fourth Circuit litigation, where the plaintiffs sued to enjoin Lloyd's solicitation for
approval of the plan, alleging violations of the federal proxy rules. 31
In the other cases, the plaintiffs alleged that Lloyd's representatives
procured their investments fraudulently (in violation of Rule 1O(b)5 and the common law) and in violation of the registration provisions of the Securities Act. 32 The Fourth Circuit ruled that the proxy
rules did not apply to Lloyd's solicitation,S3 and all the courts held
that the choice-of-law/forum-selection clauses were valid and enforceable. Thus, the courts dismissed all of the cases for lack of jurisdiction.
On the critical choice-of-law/forum-selection clauses, the courts
relied heavily on a 1972 U.S. Supreme Court case, MIS Bremen v.
Zapata Off-Shore Co. 34 Bremen involved the enforceability of a
forum-selection clause in a contract between an American barge
owner and a German towing company. The contract included
clauses relieving the towing company from liability for its negligence and designating the High Court of Justice in London as the
forum for the resolution of disputes. The towing company never
completed its contract, as a severe storm damaged the barge, and the
towing company towed the damaged barge to Tampa, Florida, the
nearest point of refuge. The barge owner sued the German company
in federal district court in Tampa, alleging negligence and breach of
contact. The District Court refused the defendant's motion to
dismiss, virtually ignoring the parties' forum-selection clause. The
Court of Appeals affirmed, ruling that the forum-selection clause is
not enforceable unless the designated forum is more convenient
than the forum in which the suit was brought. Based on several factors, the appellate court decided that London was a less convenient
forum than Tampa. Further, since English courts would likely honor
the agreement's exculpatory clause, contrary to the likely result in
U.S. courts, enforcing the forum-selection clause would violate
American public policy.
31

Allen v. Lloyd's ofLondon, 94 F.3d 923 (4th Cir. 1996).

32

Thus, the plaintiffs sought damages under Sections 12(1) and (2) of the
Securities Act. In addition, several of the cases included claims under RICO.
33

See Allen, supra note 31.

34

M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972)
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The United States Supreme Court reversed the lower courts, holding that while forum-selection clauses historically have not been
favored by American courts, ''such clauses are prima facie valid
and should be enforced unless enforcement is shown by the resisting party to be 'unreasonable' under the circumstances. " 35 The
opinion gives guidance on what factors would render enforcement
unreasonable: (1) if the clause was included as the result of fraud,
undue influence, or overweening bargaining power; 36 (2) if the
complaining party ''will for all practical purposes be deprived ofhis
day in court,'' due to the grave inconvenience or unfairness of the
designated forum; 37 (3) if a strong public policy of the forum state
would be violated by adherence to the forum selection. 38 The Court
grounded its decision on the realities of international trade: ''We
cannot have trade and commerce in world markets and international
waters exclusively on our terms, governed by our laws, and resolved
in our courts.' ' 39 International trade is facilitated, the Court noted, if
the parties can agree in advance on a forum for resolving disputes. 40
The Circuit courts in the Lloyd's cases relied on Bremen because
they characterized their cases as international in character,41 that is,
Bremen in a different context. Several of the courts added that
international comity-respect for the integrity and competence of
foreign tribunals-provides another reason why the courts should
enforce choice-of-law/forum-selection clauses in an international
agreement. 42 The analysis then shifted to the whether the clauses
were unreasonable under Bremen's guidelines. In this regard, all of
the cases focused on the third factor, public policy, because of the
antiwaiver sections of the federal securities laws. Do the antiwaiver
sections demonstrate a strong public policy that the federal securities laws should apply to this controversy notwithstanding the parties' agreement to the contrary? The courts ·answered this question
35

Id. at 13.

36

Id. at 12.

37

Id. at 18.

38

Id. at 15.

39

Id. at 9.

40

Id. at 13.

41

E.g., Riley, 969 F.2d at 957 ("[w]hen an agreement is truly international,
as here, . . . ");Bonny, 3 F.3d at 159, n.3 ("[t]here is no question that the
transaction involved here is truly international.'').
42

E.g., Roby, 996 F.2d at 1363.
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in the negative, instead finding that the remedies under British law
were adequate. 43 In this view, the federal securities laws reflect
''policies of insuring full and fair disclosure by issuers and deterring the exploitation of U.S. investors," 44 and British law will not
interfere with that policy. While British law may be less advantageous to investors in some respects, 45 it is, the courts concluded,
''adequate.' ' 46
Doctrinally, the Circuit courts faced two problems. The first was
posed by dictum in an earlier Supreme Court case, Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth. 47 In Mitsubishi, a private antitrust
action, the Court said in a footnote that ''in the event the choice-offorum and choice-of-law clauses operated in tandem as a prospective waiver of a party's right to pursue statutory remedies for
antitrust violations, we would have little hesitation in condemning
the agreement as against public policy.' ' 48 The Circuits had to
determine whether this dictum controlled the Lloyd's cases. The
second doctrinal problem was whether Bremen should be distinguished because the federal securities laws, unlike the law in Bremen, include antiwaiver sections.
Obviously, none of the courts felt constrained by the Mitsubis hi
dictum. While noting the Mitsubishi dictum, the courts generally
responded that the choice-of-law/forum-selection clause was
problematic only if English law did not provide adequate remedies
to the plaintiffs. 49 Essentially, the courts read the Mitsubishi dictum
functionally, implicitly assuming that the Supreme Court was more
concerned with assuring a fair remedy for the plaintiff than with assuring the availability of the congressionally-designated remedy.
The Fifth Circuit noted that Mitsubishi was an antitrust case and
43

Bonny, 3 F.3d at 161.

44

Bonny, 3 F.3d at 161; Roby, 996 F.2d at 1365.

45

Roby, 996 F.2d at 1366 (U.S. law provides plaintiffs with "a greater variety of defendants and a greater chance of success due to lighter scienter and
causation requirements .... ")
46
See supra note 43. At least one writer has criticized this assessment of adequacy. See, Jennifer M. Eck, "Turning Back the Clock: A Judicial Return to
Caveat Emptor for U.S. Investors in Foreign Markets," 19 N.C.J. Int'1 L. &
Com. Reg. 313, 327-31 (1994).
47
Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 637 n.l9
(1985)
48Id.
49

E.g., Shell, 55 F.3d at 1229; Bonny, 3 F.3d at 161; Riley, 996 F.2d at 957.
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thus distinguishable on that basis. The court reasoned that the
special nature of the antitrust laws, assuring vindication of the
national policy against monopoly, encourages ''the bringing of
private claims in American courts.' ' 50 This reasoning is questionable, however, because in the Mitsubishi case itself the Supreme
Court enforced a forum-selection clause that designated Japanese
arbitration of an American automobile dealer's antitrust claim. The
issue was whether arbitration of an antitrust claim in Japan was contrary to the public policy reflected in the antitrust statutes. The Court
said that it was not, because the claim was not extinguished; rather,
''the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory
cause of action in the arbitral forum .... " 51 In the Lloyd's cases,
by contrast, the federal securities laws were extinguished, or waived,
by the choice-of-law/forum-selection clauses.
In overcoming the Mitsubishi dictum, all of the Circuits relied, 52
to a greater or lesser extent, on a 1974 Supreme Court decision,
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. 53 This reliance seems misplaced,
however, because in Scherk the Court simply enforced a foreign
forum-selection clause in a securities law case where the agreement
provided that Illinois law would apply. The case was similar to the
arbitration cases in which the Court overruled Wilko, because the
question was whether securities laws claims could be resolved,
under the antiwaiver sections, in a forum other than U.S. courts.
Presaging its decisions overruling Wilko, the Court enforced the
foreign forum-selection clause in Scherk. In neither the arbitration
cases nor in Scherk, however, did the Court suggest that parties
could also contract out of the application of U.S. law. Indeed, the
point of the Mitsubishi dictum is that they cannot.
The Mitsubishi dictum should be particularly persuasive in the
context of the Lloyd's cases because the Lloyd's cases involved
statutes that expressly prohibited waiver of the statutory remedies.
The antitrust statute, at issue in Mitsubishi, does not contain an antiwaiver section. As the panel in the Ninth Circuit reasoned, ''a forti50

Haynsworth, 121 F.3d at 968, quoting from Kempe v. Ocean Drilling &
Exploration Co., 876 F.2d 1138, 1142-43 (5th Cir. 1989).

u.s. 614, 637.

51

473

52

E.g., Richards, 135 F.3d at 1295

53

Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
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ori" the Supreme Court would condemn the choice-of-law/forumselection clauses in the General Undertaking. 5 4
While each of the circuit court opinions noted that the antiwaiver
sections posed an issue, each treated the question quite abruptly.
Indeed, the courts did not recognize the antiwaiver sections as
changing the legal issue before them. As with the Mitsubishi dictum,
the courts characterized the issue as relating to the adequacy of English law. Under this view, the antiwaiver sections did not, themselves, reflect any public policy different from the underlying policy
of the securities laws. Thus, it was sensible for the courts to consider
whether English law was consistent with that policy. The courts
could have characterized the antiwaiver sections somewhat stronger,
however, as reflecting a policy that parties cannot contract to replace
the substantive protections of the securities laws with other laws.
Failing to interpret the antiwaiver sections in this manner essentially
eliminates any content in them. Put differently, the analysis in the
Lloyd's cases would have been identical if the federal securities
laws did not include antiwaiver sections. Only a panel of the Ninth
Circuit-in a decision that the Circuit, sitting en bane, withdrewsaw the law differently.
In its decision, the panel reasoned that the policy-based approach
of the other circuit courts was inappropriate in light of the antiwaiver sections; consequently, the "reasonableness of the [clauses]
is not determinative of their enforceability. '' 55 Rather, in the panel's
view, Congress had already determined, in adopting antiwaiver sections, that the law of the United States would apply to solicitations
in the United States of investments in securities by residents of the
United States. 56 The panel decision suggests that the arbitration
cases do not reflect a fundamental shift in the interpretation of the
antiwaiver sections, but a reasonable outcome in the clash between
the federal arbitration statute and the federal securities laws. The
54

Richards v. Lloyd's ofLondon, 107 F.3d 1422 (9th Cir. 1997), withdrawn,
135 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 1998) (en bane).
ssld.
56

Id. None of the courts dealt directly with two important underlying issues.
The first was a question of jurisdiction: did the plaintiffs' investment in Lloyd's
constitute the purchase of securities so that the federal securities laws were
even implicated? The second was a choice-of-law question: assuming that the
investments involved the purchase of a security, was there a sufficient nexus to
the United States so that in the absence of the choice-of-law/forum-selection
clauses U.S. law would apply? See supra note 29.
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former favors arbitration, while latter does not. There is no similar
clash in the Lloyd's cases: on one hand is a public policy favoring
choice-of-law/forum-selection clauses, and on the other is a federal
statute that does not. In this face-off, the statute must prevail over a
policy not reflected in a statute. Similarly, Bremen does not support
the circuit court decisions in the Lloyd's cases. It did not involve the
application of a federal statute, much less one with an antiwaiver
section.
The panel's decision seems to make intuitive sense. The courts
that ruled against the plaintiffs read into the antiwaiver sections a
qualification that is simply not present. As the courts read the section, a purchaser of securities can agree to waive the protections of
the law, proVided the parties agree on an adequate substitute to those
provisions. In other contexts, courts generally give antiwaiver
statutes a broad reading, but notable exceptions do exist, as the next
section demonstrates.

Antiwaiver Provisions in other Statutes
Antiwaiver sections are present in various consumer protection
statutes, such as consumer credit codes,57 consumer protection acts, 58
and deceptive trade practices acts, 59 in franchising acts, 60 and in
some federal statutes. 61 In general, the courts have taken a broad
view of antiwaiver sections. They have refused to enforce general
releases of claims, for instance, unless the release was specific as to
the claims covered, or other agreements that limit statutory protections.62
The high water mark among these many cases may be a 1949
57

See, e.g., Uniform Consumer Credit Code § 1.1 07(1) ("Except as
otherwise provided in this Act, a buyer, lessee, or debtor may not waive or
agree to forego rights or benefits under the Act.'').
58

E.g., Wash. Rev. Code §§ 19.86.00, et. seq. (1989); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat.
Ann. art. 5069-7.07(6) (West 1997).
59

See, e.g., Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Tex. Bus. & Com. Code
Ann. § 17.42 (West 1987).
60

See, e.g., Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann 815 705/41 (1998); N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law
§ 687 (McKinney 1998).
61
62

E.g., Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A §§51, et. seq. (1986).

E.g., Wicker v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 142 F.3d 690 (3rd Cir. 1998);
Babbitt v. Norfolk & Western Rwy. Co., 104 F.3d 89 (6th Cir. 1997).
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U.S. Supreme Court case, Boyd v. Grand Trunk Western R. Co., 63
interpreting the Federal Employers' Liability Act. 64 This act
provides a federal cause of action for railroad workers injured as a
result of a common carrier's negligence. The act provides that venue
is proper where the defendant resides, where the defendant is doing
business when the cause of action arose, or where the defendant will
be doing business at the time of commencing such action. 65 The act
also includes an antiwaiver section that voids ''[a]ny contract . . .
the purpose or intent of which shall be to enable any common carrier to exempt itself from any liability created by this Act.' ' 66 In
Boyd, the injured employee agreed, in exchange for payments made
by the defendant carrier before its liability was established, to bring
suit under the act where he lived or where he was injured. The Court
held that the agreement was void, because it limited the plaintiff's
choice of venue in conflict with the venue provisions of the act. The
venue provision, the Court said, was a ''right of sufficient substantiality to be included within the mandate'' of the antiwaiver section. 67
Boyd is important because it demonstrates the Court's protective
attitude toward an antiwaiver section in several different ways. First,
the antiwaiver section arguably only limited contracts that affected a
common carrier's liability, while the contract in question left the
carrier's liability unaffected. 68 Second, even if the contract were
characterized as affecting the carrier's liability, the contract was executed after the liability arose, and could then fall within the settlement exception to an antiwaiver section. The agreement limiting
venue was arguably in partial settlement of the claim. The Court did
not address this issue in the opinion. 69 Third, the agreement seemed
to advantage the plaintiff more than it disadvantaged the defendant.
63

Boyd v. Grand Trunk Western R. Co., 338 U.S. 263 (1949).

64

45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1986).

65

45

66
67

u.s.c. § 56 (1986).
45 u.s.c. §55 (1986).
338 U.S. at 265.

68

Boyd is not inconsistent, however, with the arbitration cases, because
there the Court resolved a conflict between an antiwaiver section and a second
federal statute that favored the enforceability of the contract's arbitration provision. In Boyd there was no such conflict to resolve.
69

In a footnote, the Court made an oblique reference to the settlement issue.
The Court cited a court of appeals decision, on similar facts, holding that since
the statute allowed a carrier a credit for presuit payments made, there was no
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The Court made no mention of this issue either. In short, Boyd is a
case that would support a result contrary to the appellate courts' decisions in the Lloyd's cases.
The enforceability of a choice-of-law clause in light of an antiwaiver section has been an issue under state franchise statutes. These
cases provide a situation parallel to the Lloyd's cases, but unlike the
circuit decisions in Lloyd's, the courts in the franchising cases are
not unanimous and provide a rare example of state court failing to
give a broad reading to antiwaiver sections. 70 The First Circuit,
construing a Maine statute, held that the plaintiff distributor was
protected by the statute from termination without cause, and the
choice-of-law provision designating California law was not only
unenforceable, but counsel's argument to the contrary was frivolous.71
By contrast, on similar facts, the Eighth Circuit, construing the
Minnesota statute, upheld a choice-of-law clause that designated
consideration for the agreement to limit venue. Implicitly, the Court may be
saying that to the extent an argument may be made that the agreement was a
partial settlement, it was unenforceable for a lack of consideration. Id. at 264.
Under modem views of consideration, however, the agreement between the
carrier and the injured employee did not lack consideration. The carrier was
under no obligation to make advance payments, and its agreement to do so
would clearly be consideration for the employee's agreement to limit the
choice of venue.
70

Solman Distributors, Inc. v. Brown-Forman Corp., 888 F.2d 170 (1st Cir.
1989). See, also, Pan American Computer Corp. v. Data General Corp., 467 F.
Supp. 969 (DPR 1979) (contractual choice-of-law clause invalid in light of
statutory nonwaiver provision); Hengel, Inc. v. Hot 'N Now, Inc., 825 F. Supp.
1311 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (in light of antiwaiver section of Illinois Franchise
Disclosure Act, choice-of-law provision in contract was unenforceable); Flynn
Beverage Inc. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 815 F. Supp. 1174 (C.D. Ill.
1993) (same); Wright-Moore Corp. v. Ricoh Corp., 908 F.2d 128 (7th Cir.
1990) (similar result under Indiana franchise law). Compare, Modem Computer Systems, Inc. v. Modem Banking Systems, Inc., 871 F.2d 734 (8th Cir.
1989) (choice-of-law clause upheld). See also, Midwest Enterprises v. Generac Corp., 1991 WL 169059 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (contractual choice-of-law provision enforced); Banek Inc. v. Yogurt Ventures U.S.A., Inc., 6 F.3d 357 (6th
Cir. 1993) (antiwaiver section of Michigan Franchise Investment Law did not
preclude enforcement of contractual choice-of-law provision; the law listed
void provisions, including forum-selection clauses, so the absence of a choiceof-law among the void provisions suggests that such provisions are
enforceable).
71

Solman Distributors, Inc. v. Brown-Forman Corp., 888 F.2d 170 (1st Cir.
1989).
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Nebraska law. 72 Unlike the First Circuit, which would not even
consider enforcing the choice-of-law clause, the Eighth Circuit used
a balancing test, weighing the parties' contacts with each state and
the transaction, and the relative bargaining power of the parties. The
statutory antiwaiver section was not a factor in this analysis. While
it evidenced a policy in favor of protecting franchisees, the enforcement of a choice-of-law clause-that is, recognizing freedom of
contract-was a "powerful countervailing policy. " 73 These two
policies neutralized one another, allowing the court to consider the
normal factors for enforcement of a choice-of-law clause. 74 Not
surprisingly, the Eighth Circuit view is a clear minority view. 75

Statutes that Permit or Are Silent on the
Question of Waiver
There are, as one might expect, a large number of cases construing statutes that permit or are silent on the issue of waiver. While it
is difficult to summarize such a large body of case law, it seems fair
to say that courts impose exacting standards before finding a waiver
under statutes that permit waiver, 76 and are quite reluctant to recognize a waiver when the statute neither permits nor prohibits waiver.
72

Modem Computer Systems, Inc. v. Modem Banking Systems, Inc., 871
F.2d 734 (8th Cir. 1989).
73

Id. at 740.

74

Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws§ 187(2) (1969).

75

See, Rev a S. Bauch, "An Update on Choice of Law in Franchise Agreements: A Trend Toward Unenforceability and Limited Application," 14
Franchise L. J. 91 (1995).
76

See, e.g., Newman v. Tropical Visions, Inc., 891 S.W.2d 713 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1994) (strictly construing provisions permitting waiver); Smaldino v.
Larsick, 630 N.E.2d 408 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (emergency exception to Home
Solicitation Sales Act would not apply in the absence of a signed waiver);
Mamone v. Beltone Hearing Aid Services, Inc., 611 A.2d 755 (Pa. Super. St.
1992) (waiver that varied statutory language ineffective); Keyes v. Bollinger,
640 P.2d 1077 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982) (lack of counsel at time of alleged
waiver is a factor in considering validity of waiver). See, also, Brooks v. R.A.
Clark's Garage Inc., 378 A.2d 1144 (N.H. 1977), involving a New Hampshire
statute that required automobile repairers to provide a written estimate prior to
working on a vehicle. The statute allowed a customer to waive the requirement. Plaintiff repair shop repaired defendant's vehicle, without providing the
required estimate. The court held that the plaintiff could not recover for the
repairs, even in quantum meruit, because the underlying contract was illegal.
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The former category, statutes that permit waiver, is by far the
smaller one. Of greater interest for present purposes is the latter
group--statutes that are silent on the question of waiver.
Within this group, the courts have decided many cases under the
civil rights laws, particularly Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, and the parallel to the federal securities laws is striking. The
courts have struggled with the appropriateness of contractual
arbitration provisions and general releases of claims under the civil
rights statutes, just as they have under the federal securities laws,
despite the absence of an antiwaiver section in the civil rights
statutes. In 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that a union employee, who lost a claim of discrimination in an arbitration proceeding, could maintain a suit for discrimination under Title VII on the
same facts. 77 As to the employer's claim that the employee waived
his Title VII claim by agreeing to arbitration, the Court replied that
"an employee's rights under Title VII are not susceptible of prospective waiver.' ' 78 The Court cited its 1953 decision of Wilko v.
Swan in support.
By 1991, however, the status of contractual arbitration provisions
was much higher. Just as the Court had overruled Wilko and approved arbitration under the securities acts in Rodriguez and McMahon, it enforced arbitration provisions under a federal civil rights
statute. In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Land Corp., 79 the Court held
that a claimant was bound to his agreement to arbitrate his Age
Discrimination in Employment Act claim, where the agreement
covered statutory as well as contractual claims. The Supreme Court
has not yet decided whether Gilmer applies to Title VII claims, but
most lower courts that have passed on the question have ruled that it
does. 80
Another instructive set of cases is in the antitrust area. Like the
77

Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1973).

78

Id. at 51.

79

Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Land Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).

80

Mouton v. Metropolitan Life Insur. Co., 147 F.3d 453 (5th Cir. 1998);
Kauthar v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659 (7th Cir. 1998); Adams v. Philip Morris,
Inc., 67 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 1995); Metz v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 39 F.3d 1482 (lOth Cir. 1994); Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons,
Inc., 971 F.2d 698 (11th Cir. 1992); Sacks v. Richardson Greenshield Sees.,
Inc., 781 F. Supp. 1475 (ED Cal. 1991). But see Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998) (Civil Rights Act of 1991 codified
Gardner-Denver, precluding compulsory arbitration of Title VII claim).
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federal securities laws, the federal antitrust statutes reflect a strong
public policy. Where the securities laws relate to the capital markets,
the antitrust laws relate to competition in the marketplace, including
the capital markets. Unlike the securities laws, however, Congress
did not include an antiwaiver section in the antitrust laws. Nevertheless, judicial interpretation of the antitrust statutes has infused those
laws with a judicially-created antiwaiver section. 81 In Redel's Inc. v.
General Electric Co., 82 for instance, the defendant in a Clayton Act
action sought to defend on the basis of a general release executed by
the plaintiff. The court disposed of the argument that the release
could have a prospective effect:
The prospective application of a general release to bar private
antitrust actions arising from subsequent violations is clearly
against public policy. A right conferred on a private party by a
federal statute, but granted in the public interest to effectuate
legislative policy, may not be released if the legislative policy
would be contravened thereby. 83
Later in the opinion the court said, by way of dictum, that a general release would not dispose of a preexisting antitrust claim if the
releasing party was unaware of the ''factual predicate'' for the
antitrust claim. 84 This combination-no prospective release of
claim~ and scrutiny of releases of past claims-describes the operation of a typical antiwaiver section. The federal courts have treated
the federal labor laws in a similar fashion. 85 In light of this substantial
81
See, Lawlor v. National Screen Service, 349 U.S. 322, 329 (1955); Virginia Impression Prods. Co. v. SCM Corp., 448 F.2d 262 (4th Cir. 1971) cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 936 (1972); Gaines v. Carrollton Tobacco Board of Trade,
Inc., 386 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1967); Fox Midwest Theatres v. Means, 221 F.2d
173, 180 (8th Cir. 1955); Westmoreland Asbestos Co. v. Johns-Manville
Corp., 39 F. Supp. 117, 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1941), aff'd, 136 F.2d 844 (2d Cir.
1943); Marketing Assistance Plan, Inc. v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc.,
338 F. Supp. 1019, 1022 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
82

Redel's Inc. v. General Electric Co., 498 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1974).

83

Id. at 99.

84

1d. at 100.

85

See Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697 (1945) (waiver of right
to liquidated damages under Fair Labor Standards Act held invalid); NLRB v.
Stackpole Carbon Co., 128 F.2d 188, 190 (3rd Cir. 1942) (employees could
not assign claim for back wages ordered by NLRB); NLRB v. American
Potash & Chemical Corp., 113 F.2d 232 (9th Cir. 1940) (employees could not
waive statutory right to reinstatement); Waterman S.S. Corp. v. NLRB, 119
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body of case law, one wonders what, if anything, an antiwaiver section adds to a statute infused with a public interest.

The Antiwaiver Sections and the
Administration of the Securities Laws
The Administration Problem

Allowing contractual waiver of the regulatory aspects of the securities laws would simplify the administration of those statutes.
The "private offering" exemption of the Securities Act of 1933 (the
Securities Act) provides a nice illustration of the operative effect of
its antiwaiver section. Set forth in Section 4(2) of the Securities Act,
the exemption provides that ''transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering'' are exempt from the Act's registration
requirements. 86 The language of this exemption seems to focus on
the size and nature of the offering, not on the sophistication (or lack
thereof) of the offerees. However, the courts have not interpreted the
exemption consistent with this common sense reading. Rather,
recognizing that the purpose of the Securities Act was to protect
investors, the courts have read Section 4(2) so as to limit the exemption to offerings in which the offerees did not need the protections of
the act, regardless of the number of offerees. 87 Thus, a large offering, to many sophisticated investors, would be within this exemption, while an offering to one unsophisticated investor would not
be. 88 This result was necessary, however, both to protect unsophisticated investors and to avoid protecting sophisticated investors who
acknowledged that they had received adequate disclosure. If the act
permitted waiver, the courts could have arrived at the same place
directly, holding that sophisticated investors may waive the registration provisions, irrespective of the nature or size of the offering.
This common sense result took years to reach, requiring amendF.2d 760 (5th Cir. 1941) (settlement following NLRB order invalid; Board order does not vindicate private rights, but the Act's public policy).
86

Securities Act of 1933, § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1994).

87

Securities & Exchange Commission v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119
(1953).
88

Doron v. Petroleum Mgmt. Corp.,545 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1977).
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ments to the acf!9 and considerable mlemaking by the Securities and
Exchange Commission. 90 The resulting ''private offering'' exemption today is neither as certain, nor as simple, as waiver would be.
The uncertainty of the private offering exemption is symptomatic
of larger problems with the federal securities laws. Those laws are
under scrutiny, as commentators, lawmakers and market professionals examine the continued efficacy of the federal regulatory regime.
In a recent thoughtful article, for instance, Professor Romano has
argued for a ''market-oriented approach of competitive federalism
that would expand . . . the role of states in securities regulation.' ' 91
This view competes with others, which seek to expand the federal
role, virtually eliminating the role of the states in securities regulation. 92 Both views, and those in between, share a common goal of
seeking to improve the efficiency of our capital markets. 93 It seems
clear that the antiwaiver sections are an obstacle to efficiency, and
the Lloyd's cases recognize that in an international context.
Unfortunately, the Lloyd's cases make bad law, as they avoid the
application of the antiwaiver sections by ignoring the language of
those sections.
Redrafting the Antiwaiver Sections

To achieve a measure of reality in the interpretation of the federal
securities laws, Congress should expressly permit waiver under
certain circumstances. This was the approach adopted by the drafters of the American Law Institute's proposed Federal Securities
Code. While the Code carried forward the antiwaiver concept of the
89

See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, § 4(6), 15 U.S.C. § 77(d) (6) (1994).

90

See, e.g., Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501, et. seq.

91

Roberto Romano, ''Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation," 107 Yale L. J. 2359,2361 (1998).
92

See, e.g., the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 ( 1996) (providing limited preemption of state
securities laws), and the proposed Securities Litigation Uniform Standards
Act of 1998, which would eliminate state court jurisdiction over securities
class actions involving nationally traded securities.
93
See, Steven M.H. Wallman, ''Competition, Innovation, and Regulation in
the Securities Market," 53 Bus. Law. 341 (1998) (arguing that the SEC should
abandon its practice of "incremental and command and control regulation" in
favor of one ''articualting broader regulatory goals'' and allowing markets to
satisfy them).
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federal securities laws in Section 1725(a), it suggested an exception
in Section 1725(b) (3) (C):
Section 1725(a) [the antiwaiver section] does not effect . . . an
advanced agreement . . . between any persons if a court
determines, on consideration of their financial and legal sophistication and the relationship between them, that the purposes of
this Code do not require the application of section 1725(a).94
Read literally, this provision would permit waiver of any provision of the proposed Code. However, § 1725(b) included the heading "Arbitration" and subsections (A) and (B) of§ 1725(b)l3)
expressly dealt with agreements to arbitrate. 95 The comments suggest that the drafters were concerned with limiting Wilko v. Swan,
which was then good precedent, and permitting arbitration, at least
under the circumstances indicated. The formulation, as written, is a
good one, however, and one Congress might consider. Such a
formulation makes clear that, generally, the provisions of the law
cannot be waived. It is also clear, however, that where the waiver
does not interfere with the purposes of the law, the waiver is enforceable.
A more comprehensive provision permitting waiver is included
in the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer Protection
Act. It provides, among other things, that the waiver must be in
writing, that the consumer not be in a significantly disparate bargaining position, and that the consumer be represented by counsel. 96
Any formulation along these lines would provide the necessary as94

ALI Federal Securities Code,§ 1725(b)(3)(C) (1980).

95

These subsections permit ''an advance agreement-

(A) by a member of or participant in a self-regulatory organization to
arbitrate any dispute;
(B) by any person to arbitrate a dispute arising under a rule of a selfregulatory organization . . . unless a violation of the rule is (i) a violation ofthis Code, or (ii) actionable under section 1721(a).
96

Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann.§ 17.42 (West 1987) provides:

(a) Any waiver by a consumer of the provisions of this subchapter is
contrary to public policy and is unenforceable and void; provided,
however, that a waiver is valid and enforceable if:
(1) the waiver is in writing and is signed by the consumer;
(2) the consumer is not in a significantly disparate bargaining position;
and
(3) the consumer is represented by legal counsel in seeking or acquiring
the goods or services.
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surance that a waiver would not be inconsistent with the purposes of
the act.
One obvious objection to a section permitting waiver is that it
would generate unnecessary litigation as parties who have executed
waivers seek to void the waivers. The absence of an antiwaiver section, however, has contributed to a good deal of litigation, as sophisticated investors have sought to invoke the protections of the
Securities Act by avoiding the choice-of-law/forum-selection
clauses they have signed. Moreover, the antiwaiver sections have
added to the cost of raising capital with a doubtful corresponding
benefit. As thought is given in Congress to the efficiency of the
federal securities laws, attention should be given to the antiwaiver
sections. Although not a central element in the securities laws, the
antiwaiver sections are material, and worthy of further consideration.

Conclusion
One might argue that, even if an antiwaiver section adds little, its
presence is not harmful, and an antiwaiver section emphasizes the
importance that the legislature attaches to the protective provisions
it has enacted, not a bad thing. As noted above, however, antiwaiver
sections are paternalistic and undiscriminating, protecting the sophisticated and unsophisticated alike. A proper interpretation of the
antiwaiver section in the federal securities laws would have invali(b) A waiver under Subsection (a) is not effective if the consumer's legal
counsel was directly or indirectly identified, suggested, or selected by a
defendant or an agent of the defendant.
(c) A waiver under this section must be:
(1) conspicuous and in bold-face type of at least 10 points in size;
(2) identified by the heading "Waiver of Consumer Rights," or words
of similar meaning; and
(3) in substantially the following form:
''I waive my rights under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act-Consumer
Protection Act, Section 17.41 et. seq., Business & Commerce Code, a
law that gives consumers special rights and protections. After consulting with an attorney of my own selection, I voluntarily consent to this
waiver."
(d) The waiver required by Subsection (c) may be modified to waive
only specified rights under this subchapter.
(e) The fact that a consumer has signed a waiver under this section is not
a defense to an action brought by the attorney general under Section
17.47.
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dated the choice-of-law provisions in the General Undertaking. The
investors in Lloyd's likely understood the risks they were assuming.
They clearly understood that the promoters with whom they dealt
insisted on the applicability of English law; indeed, the investors
traveled to London and signed an agreement to that effect. Such a
waiver, by such investors, in such a transaction, should be enforced,
and U.S. law should so provide. Unfortunately, it does not. Permitting waiver would solve the Lloyd's of London problem. The issue
in the Lloyd's cases would then be cast as whether the demands of
international trade (for certainty in the choice of law and forum) and
international comity outweigh the public policy that underpins the
federal securities laws. Instead, properly cast, the issue in the
Lloyd's cases was whether the courts should carve out an exception
to the congressionally-mandated antiwaiver sections. To reach a
more ''just'' result, the courts did so act.
Permitting waiver would add a sense of reality to the federal securities laws. As noted above, the private offering exemption has
been a quagmire for lawyers and their clients, in part because of the
presence of the antiwaiver sections~ If there were no such section,
sophisticated investors and businesses seeking capital, not Congress
or the SEC, could determine what disclosures, if any, were necessary. What is argued here is that the regulatory aspects of the securities laws, specifying what documents must be delivered to investors, and when, should be interpreted with some flexibility, a
flexibility that is precluded by the antiwaiver sections. On the other
hand, the antifraud provisions, which are the heart of the laws,
should continue to be unwaivable. This result would obtain even in
the absence of an antiwaiver section.

